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The Companies Amendment Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to  as "the Act") 
constitutes a modification and codification of certain aspects of the law relating 
to contracts made between companies, acting of course through agents, and 
third parties. The Act abolishes the rule of constructive notice, affirms and 
widens the rule in Ro~lul Bvirish Bunk v Turquundl (known as the rule of  
indoor management), makes provisions dealing with the affixing of a 
company's seal, and amends section 5 of the Property Law Act 1952. The 
new sections insert sections 18H to I8D into the Companies Act 1955. 
The doctrine that persons dealing with a company are deemed to have 
notice of the contents of its registered documents was long established. The 
reason for this was stated by 1,ord Wensleydale in Ernest v Nicholls2 to 
be the fact of the public nature of registration: 
All persons. thel-dore, must take notrcc ol the deed Lot scttlernentl and the  PI-ovrrrona 
of the Act. I 1  they do  not clioosc t o  acq~raint  themselvej w ~ t h  the powers of t he  directors. 
it is their own fault, and if they givc credit t o  any unauthorised persons they must he 
contented to  look to  them only, and  not t o  the company a t  large. The  s t i pu la t~ons  of 
the deed. which restl-ict and  rcgul;~tc t l l c ~ r  authority, arc  oblig;rtory on  those who  dcal 
wrth the  company . . . 
'T'his rule was developed as an exception to the normal agency rule, applicable 
to partnerships, that each member of a partnership, being an agent both 
of the firm and of each other partner, may bind the firm or the other partners 
on all contracts made in the normal course of the firm's business. Any 
agreement made among members of the partnership to limit or restrict what 
would otherwise be a partner's usual powers would not necessarily be known 
to an outsider dealing with him. Undisclosed limitations on usual authority 
d o  not bind a third party dealing with a firm or  its members. However, 
the situation is otherwise in the case of an entity required by law to make 
its documents publicly available for inspection: 
The  legrjlatur-e the11 devised the plan of incorporating these companies in a manner- unknown 
Lo the  common  law, with s p e c ~ ; ~ l  powers o f  management and liahrlities, p r o v i d ~ n g  at the 
sarrle trme that  all the worltl \houltl have nolrce w h o  were the persons authorised to  bind 
all the  jhareholders, by reqlr11-ing the copartnership deed t o  be regrstered, certilied by the 
directors, and made access~blc  to  all; and besides. including some clauscs as  to the  managcment 
I 
. . . 
This constructive notice doctrine is essentially negative as far as the outside 
contractor is concerned. It operates in favour of the company, in that the 
outsider is not permitted to assert, in attempting to enforce a contract against 
the company, that he was not aware of any limitation on the powers of 
the person with whom he was dealing which an inspection of the public 
documents would have revealed. 
However, a qualification to the rule of constructive notice developed, which 
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favoured the contractor as against the company. This rule, known as the 
indoor management rule, or the rule in ~urquand's Case (although it actually 
predated Turquand) may be relied on by a contractor where the company's 
public documents contain nothing which indicates that the contract in question 
may not be made. If the documents confer power on the company's officers 
to bind the company, but provide that certain preliminary conditions or 
formalities must be complied with before the power may be exercised, then 
the contractor is not obliged to ensure that those conditions or  formalities 
have been fulfilled. He is entitled to assume that the company's officers are 
acting lawfully. Accordingly, where, as in Turquand itself, the directors were 
authorised to borrow such sums as should be authorised by a general resolution 
of the company, and the directors borrowed without an authorising resolution, 
the plaintiffs were held entitled to assume that a resolution had in fact been 
passed. The rule was expressed by Lord Hatherley in Mahony v East Holyford 
Mining C O . : ~  
. . . when there are persons conducting the affairs of the company in a manner whlch 
appears to be perfectly consonant w ~ t h  the articles of association, then those so dealing 
with them, externally, are not to be affected by any irregularities which may take place 
in the internal management of the company. They are entitled to presume that that of 
whlch only they can have knowledge, namely the external acts, are rightly done, when 
those external acts purport to be performed in the mode in which they ought to be performed. 
The application of these rules, taken together with other legal principles 
(in particular, those of agency) has been a source of considerable academic 
and judicial discussion. The difficulties which have arisen have, on the whole, 
been related to the question of the nature of the authority which an officer 
or agent of a company must have in order to bind the company where the 
acts of that officer or agent are in contravention of provisions in the company's 
registered documents, in that a particular formality which is required to confer 
power to act on the officer or agent has not been complied with. The nature 
of the authority, if any, granted by the company (which can, of course, act 
only through human agents) becomes of paramount importance. 
On this question, it is important to distinguish two major kinds of authority. 
The first is actual authority, where the company has in fact authorised an 
agent to act on its behalf. This authority may be express as, for example, 
where the company executes a power of attorney or makes an express oral 
or written agreement with the agent; or it may be inferred from the parties' 
conduct. Actual authority rests on the notion that the parties have agreed 
to the agency relationship. Included in the scope of actual authority there 
is an authority to d o  whatever is necessary for, or incidental to, the effective 
execution of the express authority, as well as an authority to d o  whatever 
an agent of the kind concerned would usually have authority to do. 
Accordingly, if a board of directors appoint one of their number to be a 
managing director, they thereby clothe him with the authority to d o  any 
act which falls within the usual scope of that office.5 
Actual (including incidental and usual) authority must be distinguished 
from apparent (sometimes called ostensible) authority. The significant point 
about apparent authority is that it does not involve any conferral of authority 
on an agent at all; rather, it develops from a representation or holding out 
"(1875) L . R .  7 H.L. 869 at 894. 
He/!,-Hut~~l~rnson v Brajhead Lid [I9681 1 Q.B. 549 at 583 
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to a third party by a company that a person is authorised to contract on 
its behalf. The doctrine rests on estoppel, as Lord Cranworth said in Pole 
v L~askh: 
. . . whcrc one  has so  acted ;Is CI-om his conduct t o  lead another  t o  believe that he  has 
appointed someone t o  act as  his agent, and knows that that  other person is about  t o  
act o n  his behalf, then. unleas he Interposes, hc will, in general, he estopped f rom disputing 
the agency, though in fact n o  agency really existed. 
In a case where actual authority is in issue, it is the relationship between 
the company and its agent which must be examined to determine the existence 
or scope of authority. Where apparent authority is alleged, however, the 
significant conduct is that of the company and the third party; that of the 
company's putative agent is irrelevant to the question of whether an apparent 
authority is found to exist. This distinction is discussed in detail in Freeman 
und Loc~kyt>r v Bucxkhur.~t Purk Properties (Mangal) Ltd7, where Diplock 
L. J .  pointed out that the most common form of representation which creates 
apparent authority is "representation by conduct, that is, by permitting the 
agent to act in some way in the conduct of the principal's business with 
other persons". However, where a company has held out a pcrson as its 
agent and the company's registered documents d o  not permit the delegation 
of the authority in question, the doctrine of constructive notice will operate 
to prevent any contract made in these circumstances being enforced against 
the company. 
The enactment of section 18B of the Act alters the law in such a case. 
The section reads: 
I<cg~\tration of documents  not to constitute constructivc notlce ( I )  Subject t o  suhsectron 
(2)  ol this section, no person 1s allcctcd hy o r  is deemed to  have notice 01- knowlcdgc 
ol thc nicmorandum o r  artlclc!, of a conipany o r  any other- documents  o r  the contentr 
thereol hy reason only that  the n1e1no1-andurn o r  articlea o r  other documents a r e  
(a)  Pursuant to this Act 
( I )  I<egistc~-ed by the Keg~strar:  o r  
( i ~ )  F ~ l e d  01- lodged with the  I l c g ~ \ t r ; ~ r ;  o r
( h )  Ava~ lab le  for inspection at an office of the company 
(2)  Nothing in subscc t~on  ( I )  ol this sectlon applies t o  a document  registered rlndcr I'art 
1V of {hi\  Act. 
This section abolishes the common law rule that the fact of registration 
of documents is in itself suficient to fix an outside contractor with knowledge 
of their contents. This increases the protection afforded the person contracting 
with the company. The abolition of constructive notice will, of course, leave 
unaltered the case where a third party makes a contract with a company's 
agent who has actual authority to act; whether thc third party knows of 
the agent's authority or not, the company will be bound under the contract 
by virtue of its conferral of actual authority on its agent. It is in the area 
of apparent authority that a change is effected, for here, the constructive 
notice doctrine operated to limit thc normal rules as to apparent authority. 
As Slade .I. said in Rumu ('or/'. v Proved Tin & Gen~ruI nve~tn~c~nt .c ,~ ' [ i ] t  
is possible to have ostcnsible or  apparent authority apart from the articles 
of association. You cannot have one inconsistcnt with the articles of association 
" (1663) 3 L..I. Ch. 155 at 162 
119641 2 Q.H. 460 at 505. 
[I9521 2 0.13. 147 at 165. 
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or beyond the articles of association . . .". The same point was made in 
Freeman and Lockyer.' The effect of Section 18B will be to remove this 
restriction. The important issue as far as apparent authority is concerned 
is the nature and effect of any representations made by a company to a 
third party. It is the appearance of authority which matters. Where a company 
represents that an  officer or agent has authority to contract on its behalf, 
and that representation is sufficient to raise an  estoppel against the company 
to prevent its denying the validity of the contract, the mere fact that there 
are registered documents which purport to limit this authority will not now 
operate in favour of the company. 
If, however, there is some further circumstance which puts, or ought to 
put, a third party on inquiry as to the contents of registered documents, 
then notice will not be imputed to him by reason "only" of the fact that 
the documents are registered. Any factor which ought to put a third party 
on inquiry or, a fortiori, express knowledge of the company's documents, 
would tend to negative that party's assertion that he relied on a representation 
by the company which was contrary to the registered documents. 
The doctrine of constructive notice operated against the contracting third 
party. It did not enable him to assert against a company that, in a case 
where a company's documents contained an  unusual provision the existence 
of which he was unaware, he was fixed with knowledge of it such as to 
create a state of reliance on a representation by the company that its agent 
had authority to act for it. If, for example, the officer or agent made an 
unusual contract, being one that an officer or agent of this kind would not 
normally be authorised to make, and the articles provided that he might 
be granted such authority on the fulfilment of certain formalities, if those 
formalities were not completed, the officer or agent would have no actual 
authority to act. The other party to the contract would then, in order to 
enforce the contract, be forced to establish that the company represented 
or held out the officer or  agent as authorised to act for it; that is, he would 
have to establish apparent authority. If, however, the third party had never 
in fact had any knowledge at all of the provisions of the articles, he could 
not, in the absence of any other conduct on the part of the company so 
as to give rise to an estoppel, assert that he acted in reliance on a provision 
in the articles of which he was totally unaware. In such cases in the past, 
the third party has been unable to enforce the contract, for "[tlhere can 
be no actual reliance on a constructive representation"l0 In such circumstances, 
the indoor management rule was not applicable." Although the abolition 
of constructive notice will not itself alter this position, a third party in such 
a case could now be saved by section 18C(l)(a). 
Section 18C(1) provides: 
Deallngs between company and other persons - 
( I )  A company or a guarantor of an obl~gation of a company may not assert against a 
person deallng with the company or  with any person who has acqu~red any property, r~ghts ,  
or interests from the company that - 
(a)  The memorandum or articles of the company have not been complied with: 
(b)  A person named in the particulars sent to  the Reg~strar  under section 200 of this 
Act as a director or secretary of the company - 
Supra p. 505. 
I" 1. D. Campbell, "Contracts w ~ t h  Compan~es" (1959) 75 L.Q.R. 469 at 479 
e.g. Ranza Corp. (supra) 
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(i) Is not a director or secretary of the company, as the case may be; or 
(11) Has not been duly appo~nted;  or 
( i ~ i )  Does not have the authority to exercise a power which a d~rector  or secretary 
of a company carrylng on bus~ness of the kind carried on hy the company customar~ly 
has authority to exercise: 
(c)  A person held out by the company as an officer or agent of the company -~ 
(I) Has not been duly appo~nted;  or 
(ii) Does not have the authority to exerclse a power which an officer or agent of 
a company carrying on bus~ness of the k ~ n d  carried on by the company customar~ly 
has author~ty to exercise: 
(d)  A person held out by the company as an officer or agent of the company w ~ t h  
author~ty to exercise a power wh~ch an officer or agent of a company carrying on 
busmess of the kind carried on by the company does not customarlly have author~ty 
to exerclse, does not have the authority to exerclse that power: 
(e) An offleer or agent of the company who has author~ty to issue a document on 
behalf of the company does not have authority to  warrant that the document 1s 
genulne. 
(f)  An officer or agent of the company who has authority to Issue a certified copy 
of adocument on behalf of the company or otherw~se certlfy on behalf of the company 
does not have authority to  warrant that the copy IS a true copy or to so certify 
unless that person knows or by reason of his position w ~ t h  or relationship to the company 
ought to know of the matter referred to In paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or ( f )  as the 
case may he, of this subsection. 
This section codifies the rule in Turquand's case, that a person dealing 
with a company is entitled to assume that the indoor management of the 
company has been lawfully carried out. It is ". . . a rule designed for the 
protection of those who are entitled to assume, just because they cannot 
know, that the person with whom they deal has the authority which he 
claims."'2 
This principle extends to cover the case where a person's name appears 
as a director-or secretary of a company on  the registered documents, but 
his appointment is defective or, it seems, non-existent. In this respect, section 
18C(l)(b) and (c) offer a greater protection to the third party than does section 
183 of the principal Act, which provides that the acts of a director or manager 
are valid notwithstanding any defect which is afterwards discovered in his 
appointment or qualification. It was held in Morris v Kansseni7 that this 
section did not apply where there was no effort made to effect an appointment 
at all; rather, it was confined to a case where there were "slips or  irregularities" 
made in an appointment. This view was upheld by the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal in Re Northwestrrn Autoservices Ltd.14 However, at common 
law, no such distinction was drawn; where a person was named on the registered 
documents as occupying a particular office, a third party was entitled to 
assume a valid appointment had taken pIace.'5 Subsections 18C(b) and (c) 
codify the rule, so that where a company represents that a person is its 
officer or agent (whether by means of including his name as such on the 
registered documents or by some other means) the company may not assert 
that he has not been duly appointed. 
Subsections 18C(l)(c) and (d) deal with apparent authority, that is, the case 
in which an agent has no actual authority, but is represented by the company 
hlor.rrs v Kanssen [I9461 A.C. 459 at 475-476, per Lord S~monds 
I '  Ibid. 
l 4  [I9801 2 N.Z.L.R. 302 
" Mahotiq. v Eust Hol..fortl M/nrti,q Co. supra 
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as authorised to act on its behalf. These rules were exvlained in Freeman 
and Lockyer,lh which is "a formulation which has become the central character 
in the folklore on this subject".l7 The view has also been put forward that 
"the law could be greatly simplified by according de jure statutory recognition 
to the rules laid down by Diplock L. J. in [Freeman and Lockyer], rules 
which de facto already enjoy this status".l8 This is in fact what the New 
Zealand legislature has done; the law laid down in these two subsections 
is in accordance with the principles of agency outlined in Freeman and 
Lock~.er . '~  If a company represents that its officer or agent occupies a particular 
position, it will be bound by any act of that officer or agent carried out 
within his customary authority. 
Thus.  if in the case of a company the board of directors who have "actual" authority 
under the memorandum and  articles of association t o  manage the company's business permit 
the agent t o  act in the management o r  conduct of the  company's business, they thereby 
represent t o  all persons d e a l ~ n g  w ~ t h  such agent that  he has authority t o  enter on  behalf 
of the corporation into  contracts of a kind which an  agent authorised to  d o  acts of the 
klnd w h ~ c h  he is in fact pe rm~t t ed  to  d o  usually enters Into in the  ordinary course of 
such bus~ness.?" 
Where, however, the officer or agent acts in a manner which is not usual 
for one occupying his particular position, the company will be bound by 
this "abnormal"2~ contract only if it has in fact held out or represented that 
the officer or  agent is authorised to do the act; that is, the representation 
must be in respect of the act itself, and amount to more than the mere 
fact that the company has held out the officer or agent as authorised to 
occupy the office in question. 
The rules laid down in section 18C(1) are all subject to the qualification 
that the contracting third party is protected unless he "knows or by reason 
of his position with or  relationship to the company ought to know" of the 
lack of authority. Where a person has express knowledge of this, there is 
little difficulty; in such a case he can not assert that he relied on a belief 
in a contrary state of affairs.22 More difficult, however, is the case where 
circumstances are such as to put a third party on inquiry. It seems that 
the word "knows" in section 18C must mean "expressly knows", for the wording 
of the provision indicates that constructive knowledge is confined to the 
situation where it is by reason of the third party's " position with or relationship 
to the company" that knowledge is imputed to him. 
It is clear that the rule in TurquandS Case applied only to "outsiders" 
and did not protect a person such as a director, to allow him to "presume 
in his own favour that things are rightly done if inquiry that he ought to 
make might tell him that they were wrongly doneW.23 However, at common 
law, an outsider could also be precluded from relying on the indoor 
I h  Supra  
I' D M ~ l m a n  and A .  Evans "Corporate Officers and the Outsider Protection Regime" (1985) 
6 Co .  Law. 68 at 71. 
' 8  lbid p. 76 
IV Supra. 
2') p 505 
To use the terminology of Diplock L.J. In Freen~an and Loc.k,i,er. 
2 2  Ho11,urtlb Patent Ivorj, Co. (1888) 38 Ch.D.  156 
?' .Morr.!.\ \ Kunssm. (supra) at 475. 
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management rule where the circumstances relating to the agent's authority 
to act are suspicious, and so place on the other party an obligation to inquire 
into the validity of his appointment. For example, in A.L. Underwood v 
Bank of' Liverpo01,2~ a director endorsed cheques which were payable to 
the company, and paid them into his personal bank account. This was held 
to be so unusual as t o  place the collecting bank on inquiry. A case of this 
kind would be decided differently as a result of the application of section 
18C, if the word "knows" is confined to express knowledge, because the 
circumstances which should have put the bank on inquiry were not related 
to "its position with or relation to the company". If this interpretation is 
correct, and the legislature intended to disti'nguish between outsiders and 
insiders in this way, the proviso gives a greater degree of protection to the 
outsider than did the common law. 
The matter of the company seal and the formalities relating to its use 
are dealt with in section 18C(2)which reads: 
A company or  a guarantor of an obl igat~on of a company may not assert against a person 
dealing with the company or  with any person who has acqu~red any property, rights. or 
Interests from the company that a document has not been properly sealed by the company 
if -- 
(a) The document is sealed w ~ t h  a seal which appears to  hc the seal of the company; 
and 
(b)  The a f f ~ x ~ n g  of the seal appears to have been witnessed by 2 persons; and 
(c) At the time the document appears to have been sealed 
(i) One of those persons was named in the particulars sent to the Registrar under 
section 200 of thls Act, o r  was being held out by the company, as a director of 
the company; and 
(it) 'The other person was named In the particulars sent to the Keg~strar under sectlon 
200 of thls Act, or  was being held out by the company, as a d~rec to r  or secretary 
of the company - 
unless that person knows or by reason of hts posttion w ~ t h  or  relationship to the company 
ought to  know that - 
(d )  The seal is not the seal of the company; or 
(e) The afflxlng of the seal was not w~tnessed by 2 persons: or 
(0 A person referred to  In paragraph (c)(I) of this subsect~on was not a d~rec to r  of 
the company; or 
(g) A person referred to In paragraph (c) (ii) of this subsect~on was not a dlrector or 
secretary of the company. as the case may be. 
Before the enactment of this subsection, the applicable provision was section 
5(1) of the Property Law Act 1952, which laid down a presumption that 
any deed to which a company seal was affixed should bind the company 
and that "all persons dealing in good faith and without notice of any 
irregularity" were entitled to presume "the regular and proper execution of 
the deed". It was held by the Court of Appeal in Langley v Delmonte and 
Patiencez5 that "without notice" included "without constructive notice", so 
that circumstances which should put a third party on inquiry could suffice 
to invalidate the deed. In South London Greyhound Racecourses Co. v Wake26 
Clauson J .  said that a single director would not normally have authority 
to affix a company's seal to a document, for it was "within common experience 
that the affixing of the seal is a matter with which the board deals and 
not a director . . .". That case was distinguished in Langle-v v Delmonte2', 
2J [I9241 1 K.R.  775. 
2i [I9331 N.Z.L.R. 77. 
l h  [I9311 1 Ch. 496, 509 
?' Supra. 
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however, where it was held that the fact that the seal was affixed by a single 
director did not put the other contracting party on inquiry. There was no 
provision in the articles as to the use of the seal; and the company in question 
was a small private company, of a kind well known in New Zealand to 
have, frequently, only one director. 
Section 3 of the Act amends section 5(1) of the Property Law Act, so 
that it now has no application to a deed made by a company. Section 18C(2) 
now provides for the circumstances in which a company is estopped from 
asserting that a document is not properly sealed. It is subject to the exception 
that a person who "knows or by reason of his position with or relationship 
to the company ought to know" ofthe irregularities mentioned in the subsection 
will lose the protection otherwise afforded. Here, the same point may be 
made as in respect of the phrasing of the exception to section 18C(1), that 
express knowledge of one or some of the irregularities will be required on 
the part of an  outsider before the subsection ceases to operate in his favour. 
The law now appears to be that, if a company's documents are sealed other 
than in accordance with the manner defined in section 18C(2)(a) (b) and 
(c), so that there is no statutory irrebuttable presumption of validity, and, 
further, the sealing is not in accordance with the company's articles, a third 
party who contracts with the company will be protected, provided the person 
who affixes the seal is one who occupies a position which would usually 
carry with it authority to bind the company by the use of its seal. The decision 
in a case such as Broadlands Finance Ltd. v Gisborne Aero Club Inc28 may 
well now be different. In that case, it was held that the fact that the company's 
seal had been used in a manner which was inconsistent with that prescribed 
in the Club's rules sufficed to put a party on inquiry. In the absence of 
express knowledge of the rules, such a discrepancy would not now, of itself, 
have the effect of invalidating any instrument thus improperly executed. The 
inquiry in such a case would be directed at the authority possessed by the 
person who executed the deed; if, to use a time honoured example, the seal 
was affixed by the office boy, there would be no question of usual authority, 
and a third party could not hold a company bound in such a case. 
It is noteworthy that section 18C(2) applies to any "document" - it is 
not limited, as was section 5(1) of the Property Law Act, to a "deed". The 
new subsection will apply to any document, whether or not it is technically 
a deed, and so will include, for example, share certificates, which have been 
held not to be ''deedsW.2Y 
It has often been said" that if a document purporting to be issued on 
behalf of a company is forged, the rule in Turquand's Case does not apply. 
The first decision to this effect seems to  be Ruben v Great Fingall 
Consolidazed,31 where a company secretary affixed the company's seal to 
a share certificate, and forged the names of two directors as being the persons 
in whose presence the seal was affixed. To a third party, the share certificate 
appeared to be formally correct, but Lord Loreburn said: 32 
The  forged certrflcate is a pure  nul l~tk .  It 1s quite t rue  that persons dealing ~ ~ t h  l ~ m ~ t e d  
'x [I9751 2 N Z.L.R. 496 
2v So~rfh  London Gryvhounrl Rat'rc,olrrre.\ Co, v Wake. supra 
"' E.g. Palmer's Company Law (23rd ed.) 345. 
" [I9061 A C. 439 
'' Ibld.. 443. 
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liability companies are not bound to  lnqulre into their indoor management and will not 
be affected by irregularities of which they have no  notice. But this doctrine, which is well 
established, applies only t o  irregularit~es that otherw~se m ~ g h t  affect a genuine transaction. 
It cannot apply to  a forgery. 
In Ruben, the company had not held out the secretary as having authority 
to issue the certificate, and it was not within the scope of a secretary's usual 
authority "to guarantee the genuineness or  validity of a document which 
is not the deed of the companyW.33 
This case was followed in South London Gre-vhound Racecourses Co. 
v Wake,'4 which differed from Ruben in that the signature of the director 
was genuine, but the act of forgery was the unauthorised use of the company's 
seal. It was held that there was no difference in principle between the two 
cases. In Kreditbank Cassel v Schenkers,35 a branch manager of a company 
forged bills. The manager had no authority of any kind to issue such bills, 
and the company was held not to be bound by this act. These cases were 
followed in New Zealand in Mercantile Finance Corp. Ltd. v Francis and 
Taylor Ltd.,36 where forged documents were held "simply null and void". 
There is, however, authority for the proposition that the facts that an 
agent or servant acts fraudulently and for his own benefit d o  not, of themselves, 
take the acts out of the scope of the agent's or  servant's authority. In Lloyd 
v Grace Smith and Co.37 (a case which Scrutton L. J. had "a little difficulty 
in recon~iling"3~ with Ruben) a solicitor's managing clerk who was authorised 
to act in the conveyancing business of his principal, induced a widow to 
sign documents which were, unknown to her, in fact conveyances of her 
property to the clerk. The principal was held liable for the clerk's fraud. 
This case did not itself involve forgery; however in Uxhridge Building Society 
v Pi~kard,3~ a solictor was held liable for the acts of his fraudulent clerk, 
although they involved uttering forged documents, on the basis that the acts 
performed were within the scope of his authority. The clerk was acting within 
the scope of the class of activities involved in conveyancing, and so bound 
his employer. Sir Wilfrid Greene M.R. explained this case on agency 
principles:40 
I can find no justification in any of the observat~ons In those casesll'l for the suggestion 
that a forgery, ~f in other respects ~t comes within the scope of ostensible author~ty.  In 
any way prevents that doc t r~ne  from applying. 
The cases in which it has been held that the rule in Turquandk Case 
is not applicable to forgery can perhaps all be explained on the basis of 
" Ibid., 444, per Lord Macnaghten. 
j4 Supra 
[I9271 1 K.B. 826. 
'" [I9291 N.Z.L.R.  731 
37 [I9121 AC 716 
' V n  k'vrdrthank Cassel, supra. 8 3 9  840 
3v  [I9391 2 K.B. 248. 
"' Ibld., 256. It was pointed out by Gower, Princi/~les of Modern Company 1 . u ~  (4th ed.), 
p.204, that the part of his judgment In which Greene M.R.  attempted to explain that the 
Indoor management rule was unrelated to  normal agency prlnc~ples does not appear In the 
Law Report, "from which it may be deduced that the learned judge had second thoughts". 
4 '  vi7. Ruben (supra), Kredrthunk Cu.s.\rl (supra) and S1in~sh.v v 1lrsrrrc.t Bunk [I9321 1 K.B.  
544. 
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lack of authority on the part of the agent in question42. In the 
company secretary was not acting within the scope of his usual or apparent 
authority, and the same point can be made about the South London 
Greyhound Racecourse44 case; that is, that it was not within the usual authority 
of a director to affix the company seal to a document. In Mercantile Finance,45 
Adams J .  held that there was no authority for the director in question to 
bind the company by borrowing. 
The combined effect of section 18Cl(e) and (f) and section 18D appears 
to establish the law as being on this basis of authority. The effect of this 
change in the law is that the courts' "unaccountable reluctance to hold a 
company liable when documents are issued by fraudulent officers"4h will not 
continue.47 Provided the company's officer or agent is a person who has 
authority to issue a true document or a certified copy on the company's 
behalf, the company will be liable if the document or copy which is issued 
proves to be false. The amendment therefore removes any doubt as to the 
effect of the line of "completely anomalous"4x cases in which the rule of 
indoor management was held inapplicable to forgeries. 




" Final Report of the Comm~saion ol Enquiry into the Work~ng and Admin~stration of the 
present Company Law of Ghana, p. l I. 
4' In contexts other than company law, the fact that a forgery has taken place has not necessar~ly 
precluded the ra~sing of an estoppel e.g Gre~nwoodv Marrrn.5 Bank [I9331 A.C. 51 
" Xcport on the Company 1,aw of Ghana (supra) p.1 12. 
